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TECttNICAL MEMORANDUM
MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE TWO-ENGINE SHUTTLE-C
INTRODUCTION
Shuitle-C is a proposed, unmanned, cargo-cayrying launch vehicle derived from the space
shuttle primarily by replacing the shuttle orbiter with a cargo element and off loading the external
tank (ET) propellants. The cargo element will have a much smaller mass than the shuttle orbiter
and analyses indicate that Shuttle-C could deliver a target payload of approximately !00,000 Ibm to
low-Earth orbit with two space shuttle main engines (SSME's) and approximately 150,000 Ibm to
low-Earth orbit with three SSME's. The goal of minimizing development costs makes it desirable
to avoid a main propulsion system (MPS) static test program, and the goal of minirnizing operating
costs makes it desirable to utilize only two SSME's for payloads in the lO0,000-1bm class.
Therefore, a study was requested by the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Shuttle-C
task team to determine whether it would be necessary to conduct a propulsion systems test program
to verify the two-engine configuration or whether the new configuration could be verified by other
means.
APPROACH USED IN THIS STUDY
In order to determine the need for a Shuttle-C MPS test program, the first step was to con
duct detailed reviews of the following:
• Design and operating conditions, Shuttle-C versus shuttle.
• Shuttle MPT program objectives and history.
• Shuttle MPS llight experience.
After these reviews were conducted, a candidate list of MPS related hardware, software,
procedures, etc., was generated to identify all areas that could possibly require Shuttle-C MPS test
verification. Candidate areas were then eliminated if they could be sufficiently satisfied by the
following:
• Shuttle design similarity,
• Shuttle MPT prograrn experience, or
• Shuttle ilight experience.
For eachareathat remained,an assessmentwas madeto determineif it could be adequately
verified by any of the following methods:
• Analytical assessment
• Componenttesting
• On-padpropellant loading/countdowndemonstrationtest(s)
• On-pad flight readinesstype hot firing(s)
• Baselinedesignchanges.
DESIGN AND OPERATING CONDITIONS
The Shuttle-C reference design is similar to the shuttle's, except that it is an unmanned but
"manrated" vehicle with an expendable propulsion system/payload carrier. The ET/SRB
arrangement is the same as that for the shuttle. The Shuttle-C wilt use two standard SRB's and a
standard ET. However, for a two-engine Shuttle-C the ET will have off-loaded propellants
(approximately 80 percent) and relocated liquid level sensors. The two-engine version will have
two standard SSME's with the SSME in position ! removed and engine interfaces closed off and a
heat shield added.
The cargo element to ET interface loads will be within nominal STS design. In flight the
Shuttle-C will throttle to limit the load factor to 3 g, but will not throttle to limit the maximum
dynamic pressure. There will be limited engine-out capability during the late stages of ascent.
Propellant loading procedures, subsystem purges, and engine start preparation procedures will be
the same or similar to those used for shuttle.
LO2 and LH: conditions at the engine inlets for engine start do not completely meet Shuttle
Interface Control Document requirements. However, based on test histories for engine starts, satis-
factory inlet conditions for engine startup are anticipated. The inflight net positive suction pressures
at the engine inlets were calculated for flight and meet the requirements.
The Shuttle-C ,'eference configuration is shown in Figure 1. The propulsion subsystem con-
figuration is shown in Figure 2.
SHUTTLE MAIN PROPULSION TEST PROGRAM
The primary objectives for a main propulsion system test program are to obtain data on
operating characteristics to verify the design of subsystems in a systems environment, to assess the
systems operating environment to the extent possible without a flight test, and to detect component
deficiencies and defects.
• 82' X 15' PAYLOAD BAY
• CIRCULAR P/L CARRIER
• JETTISONABLE SHROUD
• CONICAL NOSE CONE
• MODIFIED ORBITER BOATTAIL
• 2 - 3 SSME's
Figure I. Shuttle-C reference configuration.
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The shuttle main propulsion system test program consisted of 12 MPT firings (see appendix
for prograln history). I)uring these firings, engines were cut off at different times for several
reasons, most commonly to make the cut-off transient more conservative or to simulate engine
failures. Also, these engine shutdowns were done at different power levels. These test firings
helped provide [\_r a better undcrstanding of the propulsion system operating conditions. They also
provided the nleans tO verify system prediction capabilities. Table 1 summarizes the MPT one-
engine and two-engine operational histories.
During the shuttle MPT program, a number of anomalies and.failures were experienced.
These are summarized in Table 2. Of these anomalies and faihires, all were resolved for the shuttle
llight configuration. Many were due to immaturity of components at the time of the system tests.
Only those listed below were judged to have required a system test to discover them:
1) LO+ and I.He prepressurizalion overshoot
2) LH_ recirculation pump cavitation
3) Nitrogen condensation and LN2 dripping in the engine con3partment
4} Heat shield differential pressure excecdances caused by' ignition overpressure
5) inadequate ET nosecap purge
6) LO__ ullagc pressure overshoot.
I+02 and Ltt2 prepressurization were performed prior to test firings and the overshoots were
conlrol system problems.
Recirculation pump cavitation was a procedural problem; the pumps were well known, hav-
ing bccn used on the S-II and S-IVB stages of the Saturn V launch vehicle.
Nitrogen pur<,e_ _<-'ascommonly condenses on uninsulated or poorly insulated surfaces, and
some changes usually have to be made in insulation configuration on any launch vehicle.
Ignition overpresstue has been observed in single engine tests. The phenomenon results from
thc fuel lead during the start transient. When LO_ reaches the injector and ignition begins, an
accumulation of hydrogen gas has ah'eady occurred in the combustion chamber and nozzle and has
become mixed v, ith ambient air. This mixture is then ignited by the combusting propellants. The
solution to this problem was to provide igniters or "sparklers" near the nozzle exit to ignite the
hydrogen as it mixes with air. In the main propulsion test program, a high overpressure on the
orbiter baseplatc occurred in one test prior to the inchision of the external igniters.
The ET nosecap purge problem was one that could have been handled in a component test
of the ET: however, the purge verification was planned for MPT instead. The solution was an
increase in the nosecap purge gas heater power.


TABLE !. SHUTTLE MPT ONE- AND TWO-ENGINE OPERATIONAL HISTORY
SF-2
• El cutoff at 18.8s (from 70% power level)
• E2 and E3 cutoff at 20.6 s (70%)
SF-4
• E2 cutoff at 90 s (70%)
• E1 and E3 cutoff at 100s (70%)
SF-6-04
• E2 cutoff at 505 s (70%)
• El and E3 cutoff at 555 s (70%)
SF-7-02
• E2 cutoff at 520 s (70%)
• El and E3 cutoff at 555 s (70%)
SF-9-02
• E3 cutoff at 530 s (65%)
• E2 cutoff at 545 s (65%)
• El cutoff at 574 s (65%)
SF-11-02
• E2 cutoff at 438 s (65%)
• E1 and E3 cutoff at 586 s (65%)
SF-12
• E3 cutoff at 235 s (100%)
• El and E2 cutoff at 624 s (100%)
Total 2 engineoperationaltime = 649 s (10.8 min)
Longest2 engineoperationaltime = 389 s (6.5 min)
Total i engine operational time = 29 s (0.5 min)
Longest I engine operational time = 29 s (0.5 min)
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The LO2 ullage pressure overshoot occurred briefly during the early part of firings SF-7-01
and SF-8. This occurred because a vacuum reference system was incorporated to simulate pressure
drops with increasing altitude during ascent and the gaseous oxygen (GOX) flow control valves had
not been reorificed to compensate for the lower reference pressures for these tests.
It can be seen that all of these anomalies/failures, except ignition overpressure and LO,
ullage pressure overshoots, were encountered during preparation for firing. Ignition overpressure
occurred at engine ignition, and L02 ullage pressure overshoot occurred in the early part of firing.
Several of these propulsion system problems would have been made worse if one engine had been
removed. The indication from these problems experienced during the MPT program is that for the
Shuttle-C, critical periods affected by modifications are during propellant conditioning prior to
engine start and during the early part of the firing.
SHUTTLE FLIGHT EXPERIENCE
An extensive database of propulsion system related information has been developed through
the shuttle flight program that is directly applicable to Shuttle-C main propulsion system verifica-
tion. In fact, the only propulsion system-related information not applicable at this time are data that
would be invalidated by the removal of one SSME, by the off-loading of the propellant tanks, or
by the use of foam insulation for the LHz feedline instead of using a vacuum-jacketed feedline.
Some two-engine operational experience has been gained through the shuttle flight program.
For STS-51F, engine 3 was shutdown at T+343 s because of an high pressure oxidizer turbopump
(HPOTP) discharge temperature redline violation. Engines I and 2 continued to operate for an
additional 238 s and were cut off from a power level of 91 percent with no anomalous steady-state
or shutdown transient characteristics.
All shuttle propulsion system elements have been fully operational since the developmental
flight program (STS-I through STS-4) was concluded. However, some enhancements to perform-
ance and reliability are presently being worked. These include the certification of the SSME's at
109 percent power level, the replacement of the GO2 flow control valves with orifices, and the
possible replacement of the SSME oxidizer heat exchangers with external heat exchangers. These
items will be fully verified through subsystem tests and shuttle flight experience. The Shuttle-C
program should not require any reverification in order to incorporate these items.
EVALUATION OF CANDIDATE AREAS FOR TEST VERIFICATION
An initial list of areas that could conceivably require verification through Shuttle-C propel-
lant load or hot-fire testing is presented in Table 3. This list was established with major areas
presented in a somewhat chronological order. The major areas were broken into applicable sub-
systems, components, procedures, etc., that might possibly require some Shuttle-C propulsion
system test verification.
TABLE 3. INITIAL LIST OF CANDIDATE AREAS FOR SHUTTLE-C
PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST VERIFICATION
• Countdown Verification
Propellant Loading
• Loading procedures
• Boiloff and replenish rates
• Extended countdown hold effects
• Helium inject system
• LO, bleed/drainback
• LH, recirculation
• Prepressurization
• Inlet conditions (start box)
• Hazardous gas detection system
• LH2 high-point bleed
Buildup Transient Analysis
• Start sequence for two SSME's
• Hold down time after SSME ignition
• Loads transfer through thrust structure
• Redlines
Engine Operation
• Throttling
• Gimbaling
- Angles
- Rates
• Nozzle and base heating
• ME-I heat shield closeout
• Net positive suction pressure (NPSP)
• goads transfer through thrust structure
• Engine-out effects
• Redlines
• POGO pulsing
Pressurization System Performance
• LO, ullage pressure slump
• Flow control operation, nominal
• Flow control operation w/failed flow control valve(s)
• Pressurization with engine-out
• Propellant Feed System Performance (Surges, Vibrations, etc.)
Shutdown Analysis
• Two engine
• One engine (engine-out case)
• LO2 prevalve timing
• Post-Test Checkout and Inspection
Eachareawasevaluated.Consultationwith NASA andcontractorengineersfrom MSFC
and Kennedy'SpaceCenter(KSC) wasobtainedin all areaswheretheir experienceand expertise
could contributeto the identificationof test requirementsand alternateways to satisfy them.
Resultsof the evaluationsare as Iollows.
All identified test requirementsfor the tollowing areascould be satisfiedwith on-pad
propellant loadingand shortduration FRF tests, similar to the tests conducted at KSC prior to the
maiden flight of each space shuttle orbiter:
• Countdown demonstration
• Propellant loading
• Buildup transient analysis
• Shutdown analysis
• Post-test checkout and inspection.
Engine Operation'
Throttling and Gimbaling- An extensive base of experience has been developed through
the shuttle MPT and flight prograrns. However, Shuttle-C hot-fire verification would be
desirable, prirnarily for SSME gimbaling if profiles differ significantly from those used
with shuttle. Combinations of gimbal angles and rates could be tested with an on-pad
flight readiness firing tFRF) of sufficient duration.
Nozzle and Base Heating -- The main components of these are radiation and convective
heating. Analytical models tit MSFC can accurately simulate radiation heating and its ef-
fects. Convective heating is more difficult to model. However, convective heating is most
pronounced at higher altitudes as the SSME exhaust plumes expand. This condition
cannot be duplicated with a sea level hot-firing. Nozzle and base heating are therefore not
considered to be drivers [or hot-fire testing. However, any hot-fire test that is conducted
probably should be done with instrumentation to determine these effects to take advantage
of the opportunity.
ME-I Heat Shield Closeout -- Not a driver for hot-fire testing. However, the opportunity
to test for heat transfer to the aft cornpartment and vibration should be taken on any hot-
firing conducted that might reach I or 2 min in duration.
• Net Positive Suction Pressure (NPSP) -- Can be accurately determined analytically. Any
hot-firing would lack solid rocket motor (SRM) and acceleration effects.
Loads Transfer -- This should be verified. Shuttle-C should be instrumented for this. A
short duration FRF would be sufficient because the critical loads occur during SSME
buildup.
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• Engine-out -- Shuttle MPT experience with one-engine operation from SF-9-01, SF-9-02,
and SF-I 1-01 is applicable. Therefore, single engine verification is not a driver for hot-
fire verification. However, an engine-out conducted during the last stages of an on-pad
FRF would provide useful data on the transient effects on various propulsion subsystems
and one-engine steady-state performance of the LH2 and LO2 pressurization systems.
• Redlines -- No requirements for special assessments of performance redlines were
identified.
• POGO Pulsing -- Extensive POGO testing, conducted during the shuttle MPT program,
is directly applicable to Shuttle-C. The SSME POGO accumulators should need no
special verification with the Shuttle-C configuration.
Pressurization System Perforrnance:
LO2 Ullage Pressure Slump -- The pressure drop that occurs shortly after liftoff on
shuttle has been determined to be primarily a result of kO2 tank "'breathing" that is
caused by SRM thrust buildup loads. The problem is more pronounced because of the
small initial LO2 ullage. Analytical models have been developed that can predict the LO2
ullage pressure slump.
Nominal Pressurization -- Pressurization system studies indicate that LH:, tank pressuriza-
tion performance will not differ enough from shuttle to warrant any special test verifica-
tion. However, LO-, pressurization is a different matter. Studies show that with a large
initial LO2 ullage volume and two SSME's providing GO2 through standard heat
exchangers, flow control valves, and orifices, the ullage pressure control band upper limit
of 22 psid will be exceeded at about T+ 70 s. The pressure will peak at about 26 psid
near T + 100 s and start to decline and will be back inside the control band at about
T + 255 s. These LO2 pressurization studies indicate that the pressurization flow control
orifices will have to be resized. An analytical determination of the orifice sizes can be
made. However, shuttle pressurization models are based to some extent on empirical
shuttle data, and complete confidence in results of resizing the LO2 flow control orifices
would require a relatively lengthy hot-firing.
With everything considered, LO2 pressurization becomes a prime driver for main propul-
sion system verification testing. A hot-firing with a duration of approximately 2 rain
should be adequate to verify LO2 pressurization system performance.
• Pressurization with Failed Flow Control Valve or Engine-out -- These can be determined
analytically from nominal pressurization data and require no special testing.
Propellant Feed System Performance:
• No special assessments are required. The LO2 and LH2 feedlines to the removed engine
will be blocked off flush at the respective manifolds. This should result in no significant
change to overall flow dynamics.
11
MAXIMUM ON-PAD FRF DURATION
Analyses discussed in the preceding section indicate that requirements exist for hot-fire
verification for several areas of the Shuttle-C main propulsion system. Two alternatives to conduct-
ing these test verifications exist. The first is to conduct an MPT program for Shuttle-C similar to
the MPT program that was conducted for shuttle. This utilized a main propulsion test article
(MPTA) for a long series of tests at the Stennis Space Center. This would be quite expensive and
time consuming. The second alternative, conduct hot-fire test verifications on the pad at KSC,
would provide a very significant benefit to the Shuttle-C program in terms of cost and scheduling
if all requirements could be adequately satisfied.
On-pad FRF's of up to 20 s duration have been conducted for shuttle. This duration would
be insufficient for Shuttle-C. A study was undertaken to determine the maximum duration that
would be feasible for on-pad hot-fire testing at KSC.
The limiting factor on test duration is the amount of water available to satisfy flame deflec-
tor cooling and acoustic suppression requirements. The water storage capacities at pads 39A and
39B are 280,000 and 300,000 gallons, respectively. Required flowrates are 65,000 gallons per
minute (gpm) Ii)r SSME acoustic suppression and 75,000 gpm for flame deflector cooling for a
total of 140,000 gpm. For a shuttle launch, there is an additional 400,000 gpm required for solid
rocket booster (SRB) related sprays which would be disabled for an extended FRF. Dividing the
water capacities by the required flowrates yields a maximum duration of 120 s for pad 39A and
129 s for pad 39B. For an on-pad firing, about 4,000 gallons would have to flow through the
water system before flowrates would reach acceptable levels for SSME ignition. This water
requirement can be met by the amount initially in the lines below the storage tank bottom. The
Firex system utilizes water from a different source and does not affect test duration.
There may be a requirement for heat shielding to protect the ET aft dome area. A heat
shield is available for this purpose, although the 20 s shuttle FRF did not utilize the shield and no
detrimental results occurred. Also, a study will be required to assure that heat radiated back
through the launch pad SRB openings would not be a problem. Shielding could be provided if
needed.
SUMMARY
While this study indicates that an MPT program is not required for Shuttle-C, at least one
FRF of extended duration will be required. This is only possible because the Shuttle-C is very
close to the present shuttle insofar as its propulsion system configuration is concerned. A reexami-
nation of the shuttle MPT program showed that there were many problems uncovered that would
have caused extended delays to the shuttle program if they had not been found early through the
test article instead of on the first shuttle FRF. Additionally, the ignition overpressure problem
experienced in the MPT program could have proven catastrophic if it had occurred in flight.
12
The primary conclusionsof this studyaresummarizedas follows:
I. At leastone propelhmtloadingtest shouldbe planned.A secondtest would serveas a
contingencyif additional verificationwere required.
2. Hot-fi,e verification of the main propulsionsystemwill be required.
3. The maxinmnlon-padFRF duration is approximately2 rain and is limited by the water
supply for cooling and acousticsuppression.This mattershouldbe thoroughlyevaluatedsincethis
greatly'exceedsany previousshuttleFRF duration. A water flow test shouldbe conductedto verify
the time requiredto consumethe entire water supply.
4. LO2 tank pressurizationhasbeenidentified as the most likely areafor which a full 2
rain duraticmFRF may be required.
5. It is considereda reasonablegoal to verify the Shuttle-Cmain propulsionsystemwithout
a separatemain propulsiontest program, but to rely on propellant loading tests and FRF's at the
launch site. ttowever, consideration should be given to the fact that on-pad FRF testing should be
success-oriented. Any,' anomaly, that would require removal of the vehicle from the pad for repairs
or modifications could severely impact the program in both cost and scheduling.
13
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APPROVAL
MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE TWO-ENGINE SHUTTLE-C
By E.E. Lynn and G.K. Platt
The information in this report has been reviewed for technical content. Review of any
infi_rmation concerning Department of Defense or nuclear energy activities or programs has been
made by the MSFC Security Classification Officer. This report, in its entirety, has been determined
to be unclassified.
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